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Abstract—This paper provides a proof of concept for using
SRAM based Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to generate
private keys for IoT devices. PUFs are utilized, as there is
inadequate protection for secret keys stored in the memory of the
IoT devices. We utilize a custom-made Arduino mega shield to
extract the fingerprint from SRAM chip on demand. We utilize
the concepts of ternary states to exclude the cells which are
easily prone to flip, allowing us to extract stable bits from the
fingerprint of the SRAM. Using the custom-made software for
our SRAM device, we can control the error rate of the PUF to
achieve an adjustable memory-based PUF for key generation.
We utilize several fuzzy extractor techniques based on using
different error correction coding methods to generate secret keys
from the SRAM PUF, and study the trade-off between the false
authentication rate and false rejection rate of the PUF.
Index Terms—PUF, key generation, IoT, SRAM, Fuzzy Extrac-
tors
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of things is one of the booming technologies in
the current era. It allows the connection of various sensors,
devices and everyday objects to interact with each other,
transfer and retrieve data, intelligently respond and trigger
actions accordingly. Today, many devices which paved the way
to the advancement of smart homes to smart cars are connected
through IoT networks. Medical devices like pacemakers and
neurosimulators which allow monitoring of patients from afar,
are connected through IoT [1].
Though IoT allows massive advancements in various fields,
it comes with unique challenges considering its heterogeneous
nature and the large number of devices. By the year 2020, it is
expected that about 20 billion devices will be connected to IoT
network. Sensitive information is exchanged between different
IoT “things”, which is responsible for the proper functioning
of smart car, pacemakers, neurosimulators or smart home.
Bio-medical devices such as pacemakers and neurosimulators
usually send small electric pulses to the heart and brain,
respectively. If adversaries manage to send unwanted electric
pulses to the brain or heart, it may lead to serious threats to
patient safety. For instance, if such sensitive information is
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hacked or tampered, it may cause serious injuries or death
of a person [2]. An article published by CNBC in 2016
discusses the possibility of cyber-criminals targeting medical
devices [3]. Therefore, it is very important to ensure safe and
secure encryption of messages. Success of IoT depends on the
security it can provide over innovation.
Security challenges in IoT encompass different aspects of
identification, authentication, encryption, confidentiality, jam-
ming, cloning, hijacking and privacy as explained in Table
I. IoT networks are prone to various types of attacks such
as spoofing, data manipulation, replay routing, Denial of
Service (DoS), node capture and Sybil attack which are briefly
explained in table II
Several characteristics of IoT networks including the low
power of IoT nodes, the low computational capability com-
bined with the heterogeneity and large scale nature of IoT
networks limit the application of standard security mechanisms
to the IoT networks. In this paper, we focus on the problem of
identification, authentication and encryption of the messages
sent between two IoT devices to protect the confidentiality of
the sensitive information transmitted.
Encryption has been widely used by several mechanisms
in order to send the messages without the risk of being
understood by the hackers and to eliminate the risk of data
manipulation. Hence, cryptographic methods play a crucial
role in the security of IoT systems. The majority of common
cryptographic mechanisms such as public key infrastructure
(PKI), advanced encryption standard (AES), and elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC) rely on private cryptographic keys [4].
These secret cryptographic keys are expected to be robust,
reliable and reproducible and there are usually stored in
the non-volatile memory (NVM) of the devices. However,
the NVMs are highly susceptible to physical attacks due to
their robust electrical nature. Several hardware-based security
solutions have been developed to enhance the security of
private-key based cryptographic methods [5], [6].
Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are a hardware-
based security primitive introduced in 2002 [7]. The PUF
utilizes the intrinsic manufacturing variations in a device to
generate a fingerprint of the hardware that offers the valuable
advantage of unclonability. This means that the device cannot
be cloned even when a hacker has physical access to the
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TABLE I
DEFINITIONS OF DIFFERENT SECURITY THREATS IN IOT NETWORKS
Name Definition
Identification Unique information describing the subject, which can be utilized to identify it
Authentication Secret information confirming the identity of the subject
Encryption Conversion of plain text to protected message, called cipher
Confidentiality State of keeping a secret
Jamming Denial of Service attack in a wireless medium
Cloning Replicating the process
Hijacking Attacker gaining control of the system
Privacy Ability to protect sensitive information
TABLE II
ATTACKS IN IOT NETWORKS
Attack Impact
Spoofing Malicious user impersonating another device to launch attacks on network hosts
Replay routing information Fraudulent repeating or delaying of valid data transmission
Data manipulation Altering sensitive information
Denial of Service (DoS) Reduction in networks’ capacity, disable the network
Node capture attack Stealing sensitive information from a captured node to compromise the entire network
Sybil attack Node claiming multiple identities
device. Therefore, the PUFs are unique to their device and
can be used as a security primitive to enable device-based
identification, and authentication. More importantly, PUFs
can provide a low cost alternative solution for on-demand
generation of cryptographic keys from the device rather than
the conventional methods, where the secret keys are produced
and distributed by the server and stored in the IoT device
memories [8].
In this paper, we developed a proof-of-concept key genera-
tion mechanism using static random-access memory (SRAM)
PUFs, which does not involve the key storage in the devices’
memory. This developed technology utilizes the idea of ternary
PUFs [9] that has proven to create stronger PUFs compared to
common binary PUFs. The developed key generation mecha-
nism has been tested using different SRAM devices. We also
evaluated the ability of various fuzzy extractors proposed in
the literature to extract the key of the noisy PUF input.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section II,
we introduce the concepts of PUFs and focus on SRAM based
PUFs and its characterization. In section III, we explain, how
Fuzzy extractors can be used to correct the noisy input PUF
response. In section IV, we describe the key generation and
regeneration process using fuzzy extractors proposed in the
literature. In section V, we discuss our experimental setup,
the custom-made software and Arduino shield which allows
us to extract SRAM responses on demand. We then use these
responses to generate secret keys using Fuzzy extractors.
II. PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS
A. PUF-based technology
Physical unclonable functions (PUF) are the equivalent of
human fingerprints; the variations created during fabrication
makes each PUF authenticable from each other. Authentication
protocols based on PUFs [7], [10]–[17], can be effective when
these PUFs show intra-PUF stability, and offer inter-PUF
randomness. Memory structures [18]–[25], SRAM [18], [19],
DRAM [20], Flash [21], ReRAM [22], [23], and MRAM [24],
[25], are all suitable to generate strong PUFs.
One method to generate PUFs from memory devices is to
characterize a particular parameter P of the cells of its array.
The values of parameter P vary cell to cell, and follow a
distribution with a median value T. The cells with P < T
generate “0” states, and others generate “1” states. The PUF
“Challenges”, also called “initial” responses is the data stream
generated during “enrollment” of the clients devices by the
server. In some protocols, the Challenges can be generated by
processing, or averaging, multiple queries and measurements
of the PUFs. These Challenges can be represented by binary,
ternary, or any other radix.
During enrollment, the “Challenges” of the PUFs located in
each client device are securely downloaded in a data base of
the server. The PUF responses is the data streams generated by
the PUF during the life of the client devices. These PUFs are
physical elements that can age, and be subject to temperature
changes, electro-magnetic interferences, and other environ-
mental effects. Challenge-response-pairs (CRP) are generated
on demand by the server of the PUFs of client devices. When
the PUF is a strong PUF, the server needs to send instructions
to the client devices to find the particular address in the PUF,
to generate challenge-response-pairs. The Helper is the data
stream generated by the server from these challenges which
is transmitted to the client devices to correct the responses.
Some authors call the instructions the challenges, the CRPs
then become the pairing of the initial responses to the freshly
generated the responses.
When the CRP error rates are below 10%, the responses
can be used as part of the authentication protocol, which
has significant commercial value to protect cyber physical
systems. Satisfactory authentications have low false rejection
rates (FRR), and low false acceptance rates (FAR). The use
Fig. 1. PUF-based cryptography with an error correcting scheme.
of PUFs to generate cryptographic keys from the responses is
more challenging than generating responses for authentication;
a single-bit mismatch in a cryptographic key is not acceptable
for most encryption protocols. This requires schemes that fully
correct the responses of the PUF.
A typical architecture to drive a network of client devices
with PUFs is shown in Fig.1. The server initiates the pro-
cess by sending instructions to the client device to find the
addresses i within the PUFs which act as wallet of keys,
and to extract the Responses Xi. The server independently
analyses the challenges Xi stored in the table at address i,
and generates the Helper with error correcting methods. The
Helpers are transmitted to the client devices as part of the
protocol. The client device corrects the response Xi with the
Helper and correcting methods such as a fuzzy extractors. To
be acceptable for encryption, the corrected responses, and the
challenges of the server should be perfectly identical. Thereby,
the same key Xi is independently generated for encryption
schemes.
Such PUF-based protocols have several weaknesses when
utilized in IoT networks. The client devices are burdened, and
need to consume additional computing power to run the error
correcting codes; and such protocols increase the vulnerability
to side channel attacks, differential power analysis, and the
potential exposure of the Helpers. In this paper, we develop
a PUF-based key generation scheme based on using a ternary
state key generation method to exclude fuzzy cells in the PUF.
We also utilize low power correction schemes to minimize
the length of the Helper, and computing power needed to
deliver error free keys to address the needs of a key generation
mechanism in IoT networks.
B. SRAM-based PUFs
SRAM-based PUFs exploit the lack of perfect symmetry
of their cells, which are designed with flip-flop logic. The
SRAM cells tested in this work have six transistors per cell,
four transistors for the flip-flop, one transistor to control the
programming of the cell, one transistor to control the read.
During the programming cycle, the flip-flop is set at “0”, or
“1”; during read cycle, the state of each flip-flop is detected.
Power-off/power-on cycles are used to get PUF functionality
from SRAM devices. During power-off/power-on cycles, the
Fig. 2. Characterization of the intra-PUF, and inter-PUF error rates.
cells have an equal opportunity to recover a 0 or 1 state;
however, the majority of the cells of the SRAM arrays have
predictable behavior. In most cases, they have a preferred state
either a 0 or a 1 due to natural variations, introduced during
the manufacturing of the devices; the flip-flop cells are never
perfectly symmetrical. Examples of variations include slight
differences in the size of the transistors due to non-uniformities
of the photolithography of the process, micro-defects, natural
variations of the chemical composition of the metallic lines,
and many other small fabrication parameters.
Each SRAM cell is different from other cells; each SRAM
device is in general, different from the others. When 256 cells
are randomly selected, and subjected to power-off/power-on
cycles, the vast majority of the data stream stored in these
256 cells is predictable, and can be used as a PUF challenge-
response-pair. While the asymmetry is strong enough for most
of the cells, the CRP error rates of SRAM PUFs can be
prohibitive because some cells are too close to a symmetrical
configuration, and they can flip randomly on both sides.
C. Characterization of SRAM PUFs
The experimental work to analyze the CRP error rates is
based on 45 different 32kByte commercial SRAMs, produced
by Cypress Semiconductor. The SRAMs with the circuitry
needed for power-off/power-on cycles are assembled in custom
PCB boards, driven by Arduino boards. A complete power-off
of the SRAMs is needed in spite of capacitive and inductive
effects, which can prevent the power from switching off. To
mitigate the problem, all SRAM I/Os are shorted to the ground
during these cycles to drain the charges, and during periods
of time that are long enough, one second in this case. The
intra-PUF and inter-PUF error rated of these SRAM devices
is summarized in Fig.2. The intra-PUF error rate is defined as
the CRP error rates of each cell compared to itself. The inter-
PUF error rate is defined as the CRP error rates of each cell
compared to the cells located at the same address on a different
SRAM. For this analysis, 10 devices were characterized. When
used for authentication, this allows the modelling of FRRs, and
FARs
Fig. 3. Error rate reduction by eliminating the fuzzy cells after power-off/wait
state/power-on cycles.
As shown in Fig.3, the error rates of the SRAM PUFs
are reduced with an enrollment that incorporates successive
power-off/power-on cycles, to remove the erratic cells from
the population. During each cycle, the cells that are flipping
between 0, and 1 are removed. The estimated error rates of
the remaining cells and plotted in Fig. 3. Initially, before
eliminating the weak cells, the CRP error rates are in the
3 to 5% range. After four cycles the CRP error rates are
reduced to about 1%. After 25 cycles the CRP error rate drops
below 0.1%; then the reduction is slower. About 50 cycles
are needed to get 0.05% error rate, and 1000 cycles to get
0.01%. Such error rates are still too high for cryptography. In
the experimental work presented in this paper, the error rate
before error correcting schemes can be adjusted from 3% to
0.01%, to study the respective efficiency of the schemes.
III. FUZZY EXTRACTORS
A fuzzy extractor will extract a uniformly random string R
and non-secret string P (helper data) from its initial input w.
This mechanism will allow the string R which can be used as a
key, to be reproduced exactly with the help of P , even though
the input changes to some w′ but remains close to w. Fuzzy
extractors are said to be information-theoretically secure i.e., a
crypto-system whose security is derived only from information
theory, where a hacker will not have enough information to
break the encryption, allows them to be used in cryptography.
Fuzzy extractors are constructed using Secure Sketch (SS),
which is a pair of randomized procedures “sketch” and “re-
cover” which will allow precise reconstruction of the initial
input from noisy input by making use of some helper data P .
In the “sketch” phase, Helper Data P is extracted from
initial input w, which can be made publicly available. This
output P will be used in the “recover” phase along with noisy
input w′ to recover w. This method is secure as the publicly
available Helper Data reveals little to no information about w.
Fig. 4 summarizes the description of a secure sketch.
Fig. 4. Secure Sketch
Fig. 5. Fuzzy Extractor
Fuzzy extractor is defined by a pair of randomized proce-
dures “generate” and “reproduce”. In the “generate” phase,
the fuzzy extractor uses the “sketch” phase of the SS where
Helper data, P and Key, R from the given input w. The
“reproduce” phase uses the “recover” phase of the secure
sketch which makes use of the Helper data to recover the
original input w from a noisy input w′ along with the random
extractor used in the “sketch” phase, to extract the randomness
from the recovered w. The ability to recover w from w′ is
highly dependent on the technique, usually an error correction
scheme, used in the “sketch” phase of the Fuzzy Extractor.
If the distance between the noisy input w′ and input w is
too large, it may not be possible to recover w from w′.
Fig. 6 shows the construction of a Fuzzy Extractor using a
secure sketch. Due to the error tolerance capability of Secure
Fig. 6. Construction of a fuzzy extractor using secure sketch extractor
Sketches, their construction is based on error correcting codes.
The error correcting code C is used to correct errors in w′,
even though w′ may not be in C, by shifting the codeword.
Two different constructions are used for secure sketch are
provided [4] :
• Code-Offset Construction: For input w, select a uniformly
random codeword c ∈ C, and set SS(w) to be the shift
needed to get from c to w: SS(w) = w− c. To compute
Rec(w′, s), subtract the shift s from w′ to get c′ = w′−s:
decode c′ to get c and compute w by shifting back to get
w = c + s. When code C is linear, the information in s
is essentially the syndrome of w.
• Syndrome Construction: The sketch SS(w) computes s =
syn(w), where syn is the syndrome. To recover the key, a
unique vector e is chosen such that syn(e) = syn(w′)−s
and output w = w′ − e.
IV. GENERATION OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS FROM PUFS
USING FUZZY EXTRACTORS
Secret key generation using PUFs will allow users to pro-
duce a key from their own device which need not be stored in
the devices’ memory. Using PUFs to produce keys, will make
the device unclonable and hence less susceptible to hacking.
Using PUFs eliminates the complications and security issues
related to key storage and distribution. Different PUFs have
been used in the past to generate reliable and reproducible
cryptographic keys using fuzzy extractors.
Different schemes have been proposed in the literature for
generating reproducible keys using PUFs [26]–[31].Key gen-
eration scheme proposed in [27] uses BCH codes and random
number generators for the construction of fuzzy extractors. The
sole purpose of the BCH codes was to help reconstruct the
PUF estimate from noisy PUF data, therefore, it will serve in
the “secure sketch” phase of the Fuzzy extractor. This scheme
is one of the primitive schemes and does not require any
complex decoders, hence the error correction capability is not
good. This scheme may be good for authentication where a
certain error margin is tolerated. In key generation schemes,
where the key will be used for encrypting or decrypting the
data, the error in reproducing the key has to be zero.
Different fuzzy extractor architectures have been proposed
in the literature, whose performances are compared in the
Table III. In a recent work, a fuzzy extractor structure based
on Polar codes for SRAM PUFs was proposed [35]. This
work utilized complex Hash-Aided syndrome construction
(SC) decoder to ensure that the key was reproducible. The
results showed that the key was reproducible with a failure
probability of 10−9 and utilized 896 helper bits for a key
of 128 bits. This work utilized polar codes for extraction of
key and helper data, thus utilizing the property of zero mutual
information between the helper and key. In our previous work,
we utilized serially concatenated polar and BCH codes to
generate 250 bit keys with 262 helper data bits using SC
decoder and Belief propagation decoders, while maintaining a
comparable failure probability of 10−8 and 10−10, respectively
[36].
Here, we provide a proof of concept of key generation
using SRAM using ternary state and compare the performance
of the current state-of-the-art generators to see what is the
trade-off between good error correction to achieve zero error
key regeneration with the chance of getting false positive for
a PUF which is not ideal in terms of intra-PUF distance.
We would also like to determine the trade-off between the
performance, the level of computations and delay, and the
number of helper data bits needed to regenerate the key from
Noisy PUF responses. The device can be utilized to improve
the raw probability of error for each cell using the ternary state
method. We can realise the need to use sophisticated error
correction coding that will sufficiently correct the input bits,
without increasing the false authentication rate of the device.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
As a proof of concept, the Cypress CY62256N was chosen
as the SRAM to read from. It can store up to 32 KB of data,
which was deemed more than sufficient source of entropy.
A custom Arduino Mega 2560 shield was designed for the
DIP variant to allow for easily switching between different
packages. Every pin of the package is also connected to a
toggleable switch such that a logical OFF corresponds to
ground; without this design, the SRAM cannot be automat-
ically controlled to dissipate the current.
First, the Arduino is programmed with three modes in mind:
the first mode, upon receiving a special flag over the serial
port over USB, reads the entire SRAM one byte at time,
sends each back over the serial connection, and powers it
down; the second mode, when receiving a different flag, will
manually power the SRAM down; the third and last mode,
when receiving neither of the former two flags, will interpret
the value as a bit address and send back the read bit as the
smallest possible word (in this case a byte). The last mode
assumes to continuously read a series of bit addresses, until
the second mode is triggered and powers off the SRAM to
correspond to the PUFs lifetime.
A Python script communicates with the Arduino over the
serial connection. By default, it indefinitely loops, requests the
Arduino for the next PUF, and saves the entire contents of the
SRAM onto a successive binary file. A separate script is then
used to read every binary file and iterate over every cell based
on the following criteria: if a cell’s value has changed in any
of the reads, it is from then on marked as an “X” to represent
its unstable nature. If that cell has remained the same value
(either 0 or 1) after iterating through every read, then that cell
is given that value in the final enrollment. One can also tell
the script to be less stringent, and instead set the final values
based on the number of times the cell’s value was 1 over the
total number of reads. For instance, if the cell was 1 less than
30% of the reads, it is marked with “0”; if it was 1 more than
70% of the reads, then it is marked with a “1”; otherwise, it is
marked with an “X”. For the purpose of this experiment, the
cell prone to remain constant at least 46%, it is marked with
the constant ; otherwise it is marked with a “X”.
We tested the various fuzzy extractor schemes in the lit-
erature using an SRAM PUF device produced by the NAU
Cybersecurity lab shown in Fig. 7.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT FUZZY EXTRACTOR SCHEMES PROPOSED IN THE LITERATURE.
Fuzzy Extractor Construction Key Length Helper Data bits Failure Probability Flipping probability
Reed Muller Generalized Multiple Concatenated coding [32] 128 13952 10−6 15%
BCH Repetition Code [33] 128 2052 10−9 13%
Generalized Concatenated (GC) Reed Muller [34] 2048 2048 5.37.10−10 14%
GC Reed Solomon [34] 1024 1024 3.47.10−10 14%
Polar Codes SC [35] 128 896 10−6 15%
HA SCL Polar Codes [35] 128 896 10−9 15%
Serially Concatenated BCH and Polar codes using SC decoder [36] 250 262 10−8 15%
Serially Concatenated BCH and Polar codes using Belief Propagation decoder [36] 250 262 10−10 15%
Fig. 7. SRAM Device
The SRAM device has a software package which allows us
to interact with the device. It has various functions embedded
in it, some of which include, reading the real time PUF
response after refreshing the SRAM every 2 seconds, counting
the number of mismatches between every response, enrolling
the PUF, where it utilizes 100 reads of the PUF to determine
the stable cells in the SRAM device and stores the challenge
in the server.
We use a technique called addressable PUF generator (APG),
which allows us to extract a unique fingerprint from the device,
by randomly selecting the cells which will be used as the
fingerprint input to the fuzzy extractor.
A. Addressable PUF Generator
We use the technique of APG described in [37] to generate
challenges for our PUF devices. In APG technique, a random
number and the user ID are XORed and given as an input to
a hash function. The hash digest is used to identify a location
in the PUF. This location is given as an input to a pseudo
random number generator, which will allow us to pick different
memory cells from the device, giving a range of cells, which
are randomly selected from the entire memory chip. Fig. 8,
shows various cells selected in an SRAM fingerprint, using
a random seed given to a pseudo random number generator
(PRNG), allowing us to use bits spread across the finger print
to extract the challenge and response.
B. Varying the error rate of the device
We use ternary PUF concept to mask the bits which are
easily prone to flip in the memory device. The software allows
us to manage the error rate by varying the number of reads
used to average the SRAM challenge. We can mark the bits
which are easily prone to flip with an “X”. More number of
reads used will lead to a more stable challenge as the bits prone
to flip over a large number of reads will be marked with an
“X”. By this method, we can determine the cells which are
able to produce stable “0” and “1” and eliminate cells with the
“X”. For example, the error rate when only 10 reads are used
to average the challenge is higher when compared to using
100 reads to average the challenge.
C. Generating keys and storing them in the server
We simulated the fuzzy extractors proposed in the literature
[32]–[35] in MATLAB. We utilize the fuzzy extractors to
generate keys from challenges by varying their error rate by
changing the number of reads used to average the challenges
and mask the flipping bits with“X”. We generate secret keys
and helper data using the registration phase of the fuzzy
extractor.
D. Regeneration of Keys using PUF response
Using the helper data produced in the key generation pro-
cess, the key is regenerated. The ability of the Fuzzy extractor
to regenerate the key under different error rates is evaluated.
The False Authentication Rate and False Rejection Rate while
using different Fuzzy extractors under various error rates is
determined.
We use real-time SRAM responses of the device along with the
helper data produced in the key generation phase to regenerate
the key. The average error when an SRAM PUF is used
to generate keys using the fuzzy extractors described in [4],
[35], [36], [38] is reported in the Table IV. The FAR when
a different user imposters as an authenticated user is also
Fig. 8. Using Pseudo random number generator (PRNG) to select bits from
the finger print of the SRAM Device
TABLE IV
EFFECT OF INTRA AND INTER PUF DISTANCE ON KEY GENERATION USING DIFFERENT FUZZY EXTRACTORS
Fuzzy Extractor % Error when the same PUF is used % Error when different PUF is used
BCH Fuzzy Extractor [4] 0.2 % 47.62%
Efficient Fuzzy Extractor using BCH [38] 12.5 % 48.98%
Polar using HA-SCL [35] 0 % 19.23%
Polar using serially concatenated BCH and Polar Codes [36] 0 % 23.68%
reported in the Table IV. To calculate the FAR, another PUFs
response was utilized with the helper data provided by the
registered challenge. The FAR was low when simpler fuzzy
extractor methods like [4], [38] were utilized, but the FRR was
high as they were not strong enough to correct the errors in
the Noisy PUF. When stronger methods like [35], [36] were
utilized, the FAR was higher compared to the weaker methods,
as they were capable enough to correct more errors in the PUF,
thereby reducing their FRR.
In Fig. 9, shows the ability of a Polar based Fuzzy extractor
to derive the key at different error rates. The error rate of
the SRAM is varied by using the ternary technique. Here, we
used different number of cycles/reads to calculate the enrolled
challenge, stored in the server. More number of bits will be
marked with an “X” when more number of PUF responses
are used to enroll the challenge. Marking the cell with an “X”
indicates, removing the cell which flipped during one of the
responses used to make the enrolled challenge to be stored in
the server, thereby reducing the error of the PUF. The error in
retrieving the key from Noisy SRAM responses using a fuzzy
extractor was calculated for different error rates of the PUF.
We observed the same pattern noted in Fig. 9 for 15 different
SRAM devices. There is a clear decline in the error rate of the
key as the error in the PUF reduces. The error in key tends to
increase even when the PUF error is very low. This may be
due to the fact that the error correction mechanism used in the
Fuzzy extractor is over correcting the data, thereby changing
the correct bits. This may be one of the factor for increase in
the error of the key, even after decrease in the PUF error. Other
factors may include different parameters in the error correction
code. This is an ongoing work, therefore we will be working
on testing each of the parameters of the error correction codes
to check its effect on the key generation scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we developed a proof of concept for a practical
key generation scheme in IoT networks that does not rely on
storing the private keys in the memory of the IoT devices, but
rather generates a private key from the unique fingerprints of
the embedded memory of the IoT devices on an on-demand
basis. Such method can add another layer of security to the
common cryptographic techniques (e.g., PKI) from physical
attacks. Therefore, this method can offer a scalable security
solution for large-scale IoT networks without the need to
generate, distribute and store the private keys in billions of
IoT devices.
We have utilized a recent idea of ternary-state PUFs rather
than the traditional binary PUFs to identify the more reliable
cells in the memory of the device that can substantially
increase the robustness of the PUF responses for a very
high sensitive application such as generating the private keys
for encryption. The performance of this method has been
tested for several SRAM chips using our device. We can
vary the average error rate of PUF (i.e., selecting more stable
cells which have lower probability of flipping) using different
thresholds to define the ternary states, thus providing more
stable PUF responses as needed. These responses can further
be used to produce secret keys using fuzzy extractors. We
tested the efficiency of the fuzzy extractors using real time
SRAM PUF responses while varying its error to test the
false authentication and false rejection rate. In summary, we
like to note that the since SRAM PUFs depend on the flip
flop logic and lack perfect symmetry, it is considered as a
weaker PUF compared to some other memory-based PUFs
(e.g. ReRAM based PUF), however, it’s a common NVM
technology available in several IoT devices and offers an easy
and accessible technology to explore.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Patton, E. Gross, R. Chinn, S. Forbis, L. Walker, and H. Chen,
“Uninvited connections: a study of vulnerable devices on the internet of
things (iot),” in 2014 IEEE Joint Intelligence and Security Informatics
Conference. IEEE, 2014, pp. 232–235.
[2] E. Marin, D. Singele´e, B. Yang, V. Volski, G. A. Vandenbosch, B. Nuttin,
and B. Preneel, “Securing wireless neurostimulators,” in Proceedings
of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and
Privacy. ACM, 2018, pp. 287–298.
[3] H. Taylor, “How the ’internet of things’ could be fatal,”
Mar 2016. [Online]. Available: https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/04/
how-the-internet-of-things-could-be-fatal.html
[4] Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy extractors: How to generate
strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,” in International
conference on the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques.
Springer, 2004, pp. 523–540.
Fig. 9. % Error in generating 128 bit keys from a Polar code based Fuzzy
Extractor.
[5] S. L. Kinney, Trusted platform module basics: using TPM in embedded
systems. Elsevier, 2006.
[6] E. Barker and A. Roginsky, “Transitions: Recommendation for tran-
sitioning the use of cryptographic algorithms and key lengths,” NIST
Special Publication, vol. 800, p. 131A, 2011.
[7] B. Gassend, D. Clarke, M. Van Dijk, and S. Devadas, “Silicon physical
random functions,” in Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security. ACM, 2002, pp. 148–160.
[8] U. Chatterjee, V. Govindan, R. Sadhukhan, D. Mukhopadhyay, R. S.
Chakraborty, D. Mahata, and M. M. Prabhu, “Building puf based
authentication and key exchange protocol for iot without explicit crps
in verifier database,” IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure
Computing, 2018.
[9] B. Cambou and D. Telesca, “Ternary computing to strengthen cyberse-
curity,” in Science and Information Conference. Springer, 2018, pp.
898–919.
[10] R. Pappu, B. Recht, J. Taylor, and N. Gershenfeld, “Physical one-way
functions,” Science, vol. 297, no. 5589, pp. 2026–2030, 2002.
[11] Y. Gao, D. C. Ranasinghe, S. F. Al-Sarawi, O. Kavehei, and D. Abbott,
“Emerging physical unclonable functions with nanotechnology,” IEEE
access, vol. 4, pp. 61–80, 2016.
[12] C. Herder, M.-D. Yu, F. Koushanfar, and S. Devadas, “Physical unclon-
able functions and applications: A tutorial,” Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 102, no. 8, pp. 1126–1141, 2014.
[13] R. Maes and I. Verbauwhede, “Physically unclonable functions: A study
on the state of the art and future research directions,” in Towards
Hardware-Intrinsic Security. Springer, 2010, pp. 3–37.
[14] Y. Jin, “Introduction to hardware security,” Electronics, vol. 4, no. 4,
pp. 763–784, 2015.
[15] M. Delavor et al., “Puf based solution for secure communication in
advanced metering infrastructure,” ACR publication, 2014.
[16] J. Guajardo, S. S. Kumar, G.-J. Schrijen, and P. Tuyls, “Physical unclon-
able functions and public-key crypto for fpga ip protection,” in Field
Programmable Logic and Applications, 2007. FPL 2007. International
Conference on. IEEE, 2007, pp. 189–195.
[17] J. Plusquellic et al., “Systems and methods for generating pufs from
non-volatile cells,” 2015.
[18] D. E. Holcomb, W. P. Burleson, and K. Fu, “Power-up sram state as
an identifying fingerprint and source of true random numbers,” IEEE
Transactions on Computers, vol. 58, no. 9, pp. 1198–1210, 2009.
[19] R. Maes, P. Tuyls, and I. Verbauwhede, “A soft decision helper data
algorithm for sram pufs,” in 2009 IEEE international symposium on
information theory. IEEE, 2009, pp. 2101–2105.
[20] T. A. Christensen and E. S. I. John, “Implementing physically unclonable
function (puf) utilizing edram memory cell capacitance variation,”
Oct. 30 2012, uS Patent 8,300,450.
[21] P. Prabhu, A. Akel, L. M. Grupp, S. Y. Wing-Kei, G. E. Suh, E. Kan,
and S. Swanson, “Extracting device fingerprints from flash memory by
exploiting physical variations,” in International Conference on Trust and
Trustworthy Computing. Springer, 2011, pp. 188–201.
[22] A. Chen, “Comprehensive assessment of rram-based puf for hardware
security applications,” in 2015 IEEE International Electron Devices
Meeting (IEDM). IEEE, 2015, pp. 10–7.
[23] B. Cambou, F. Afghah, D. Sonderegger, J. Taggart, H. Barnaby, and
M. Kozicki, “Ag conductive bridge rams for physical unclonable func-
tions,” in Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2017 IEEE
International Symposium on. IEEE, 2017, pp. 151–151.
[24] X. Zhu, S. M. Millendorf, X. Guo, D. M. Jacobson, K. Lee, S. H. Kang,
and M. M. Nowak, “Physically unclonable function based on resistivity
of magnetoresistive random-access memory magnetic tunnel junctions,”
Mar. 12 2015, uS Patent App. 14/077,093.
[25] E. I. Vatajelu, G. D. Natale, M. Barbareschi, L. Torres, M. Indaco, and
P. Prinetto, “Stt-mram-based puf architecture exploiting magnetic tunnel
junction fabrication-induced variability,” ACM Journal on Emerging
Technologies in Computing Systems (JETC), vol. 13, no. 1, p. 5, 2016.
[26] G. E. Suh and S. Devadas, “Physical unclonable functions for device
authentication and secret key generation,” in Proceedings of the 44th
annual design automation conference. ACM, 2007, pp. 9–14.
[27] H. Kang, Y. Hori, T. Katashita, M. Hagiwara, and K. Iwamura, “Per-
formance analysis for puf data using fuzzy extractor,” in Ubiquitous
Information Technologies and Applications. Springer, 2014, pp. 277–
284.
[28] K. Kursawe, A.-R. Sadeghi, D. Schellekens, B. Skoric, and P. Tuyls,
“Reconfigurable physical unclonable functions-enabling technology for
tamper-resistant storage,” in Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust,
2009. HOST’09. IEEE International Workshop on. IEEE, 2009, pp.
22–29.
[29] T. Ziola, Z. Paral, S. Devadas, G. E. Suh, and V. Khandelwal, “Authen-
tication with physical unclonable functions,” Jul. 15 2014, uS Patent
8,782,396.
[30] B. Sˇkoric´, P. Tuyls, and W. Ophey, “Robust key extraction from
physical uncloneable functions,” in International Conference on Applied
Cryptography and Network Security. Springer, 2005, pp. 407–422.
[31] D. Lim, J. W. Lee, B. Gassend, G. E. Suh, M. Van Dijk, and S. Devadas,
“Extracting secret keys from integrated circuits,” IEEE Transactions on
Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 13, no. 10, pp. 1200–
1205, 2005.
[32] R. Maes, P. Tuyls, and I. Verbauwhede, “Low-overhead implementation
of a soft decision helper data algorithm for sram pufs.” in CHES, vol. 9.
Springer, 2009, pp. 332–347.
[33] R. Maes, A. Van Herrewege, and I. Verbauwhede, “Pufky: A fully func-
tional puf-based cryptographic key generator,” Cryptographic Hardware
and Embedded Systems–CHES 2012, pp. 302–319, 2012.
[34] S. Puchinger, S. Mu¨elich, M. Bossert, M. Hiller, and G. Sigl, “On
error correction for physical unclonable functions,” in SCC 2015; 10th
International ITG Conference on Systems, Communications and Coding;
Proceedings of. VDE, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[35] B. Chen, T. Ignatenko, F. M. Willems, R. Maes, E. van der Sluis, and
G. Selimis, “High-rate error correction schemes for sram-pufs based on
polar codes,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1701.07320, 2017.
[36] A. R. Korenda, F. Afghah, and B. Cambou, “A secret key generation
scheme for internet of things using ternary-states reram-based physical
unclonable functions,” in 2018 14th International Wireless Communica-
tions Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC), June 2018, pp. 1261–
1266.
[37] B. Cambou, “Encoding ternary data for puf environments,” Nov. 29
2018, uS Patent App. 16/036,477.
[38] H. Kang, Y. Hori, T. Katashita, M. Hagiwara, and K. Iwamura,
“Cryptographie key generation from puf data using efficient fuzzy
extractors,” in Advanced Communication Technology (ICACT), 2014
16th International Conference on. IEEE, 2014, pp. 23–26.
